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Lost in Transition: Puzzles of Reconciliation 
 
By Jón Ólafsson 
 
This paper discusses reconciliation as a strategy to heal social wounds 
caused by dictatorial regimes or deep economic crises. The paper treats 
two such examples: The failed attempts of the Icelandic government to 
reach a deal with the UK and the Netherlands about the repayment of 
debts incurred by the bankrupt Landsbanki Íslands and the prosecution 
of Mr. Geir Haarde, formerly Prime Minister of Iceland. It is argued 
that although reconciliation strategies have in some cases been partially 
successful, it can be counterproductive to prefer moral aspirations or 
goals, such as rebuilding trust after serious political, social or economic 
disintegration, to strictly legal ways of dealing with individual cases. As 
the case with Mr. Haarde shows, the endeavor to achieve moral goals 
using legal means can backfire in unexpected ways. 
 
1. Introduction 
The idea of reconciliation has emerged as an important dimension of 
transitional justice in the past decades. Programs in South-Africa and Rwanda 
aimed at reconciling populations and groups with a history of horrendous 
violence, even genocide, have been seen as at least partially successful (De 
Greiff, 2006). Similarly reconciliation programs have been managed in some 
Latin American countries as a part of an effort to deal with past dictatorships 
(Comissao Nacional da Verdade, 2014). The idea of reconciliation, as going 
beyond offering victims of fallen regimes to seek justice in an attempt to 
establish trust between different social (or ethnic) groups is somewhat 
paradoxical, since it seems to imply that victims conceive of themselves not 
only as victims but as somehow forced to seek partnerships with former 
perpetrators. When former perpetrators are offered rewards after periods of 
social conflict, violence, coercion or repression this becomes extremely 
difficult. While personal reconciliation seems to involve forgiveness, social 
reconciliation refers rather to amnesty: In return for acknowledging 
wrongdoing and telling the truth, perpetrators can sometimes expect milder 
treatment by courts or even be able to evade punishment altogether 





their victims’ explicit assent, i.e. without their forgiveness, it may involve 
injustice towards them. When the victims are included and their assent 
required, social pressure and lack of alternatives may be the reason for their 
cooperation rather than genuine willingness to be reconciled with those who 
wronged them (see Burnet, 2008 which explores the Rwandan Gacaca). The 
main good brought about by reconciliation is the clear and unequivocal self-
identification of the perpetrator – individual or collective – if even that is 
achieved. The problem is that to do so may require central liberal norms to be 
abandoned: Since from a liberal perspective the expression of dissent is an 
important sign of health in a liberal society, relations that require consensus 
are suspect. It is particularly dangerous from this perspective to base social 
solutions on consensus since consensus building on issues that have to do 
with rights and the interpretation of the past may easily translate into coercive 
forms of government. As I will argue in the paper this casts doubt on the 
possibility of reconciliation, at least if reconciliation is expected to go hand in 
hand with social construction based on liberal norms. 
 
2. What reconciliation is and requires 
Before I turn to the examples I discuss in this paper, it is necessary, in order 
to provide context, to briefly review the relatively recent phenomenon of 
dealing with past atrocities with reconciliation programs rather than a 
commitment to hunting down and punishing perpetrators. The rationale of 
reconciliation when it partly involves providing an opportunity for guilty 
individuals to come clean and reconstruct their lives is the danger that conflict 
will otherwise continue. If perpetrators belong to a well-defined social group, 
whether ethnically or economically, it may simply be impossible to achieve 
both retributive justice and social peace (Pankhurst, 1999). It may therefore be 
a matter of utilitarian rationality to prioritize collective well-being over justice 
for individuals. For social reconciliation to work it must at least be possible to 
prioritize community values above individual rights. It must also be a 
generally shared view that reconciliation is necessary in the sense that without 





While the South-African and the Rwandan cases are well known because 
of the great transitional effort they presented, reconciliation has also been 
seen as a necessary part of overcoming less serious crises where injustice 
appears in economic rather than in physical form and where perpetrators are 
bankers, businesspeople and politicians rather than military police and secret 
services.1 Although clearly much less serious from both a judicial and a moral 
perspective, as I will argue in this paper, such cases evoke similar questions. In 
a situation where some are seen by themselves and others as victims, there is a 
need to identify perpetrators.  
The central condition for reconciliation to be meaningful is that there are 
individuals ready to admit to their participation in wrongdoing and thus be 
identified as perpetrators (Lambourne, 2004). This would be facilitated by the 
offer of some kind of reward. There may also be present a desire to confess 
or recant regardless of reward. A reconciliation program might be conceived 
without issuing rewards, where telling the truth would be seen as e.g. an 
individual redemption. Where no reward is offered, desire to tell the truth may 
move individuals to talk – they may also not desire to do so. In short we can 











Generally speaking if the first step in reconciliation is that perpetrators move 
towards recognizing themselves as such, the possible reward may be an 
incentive to do so, regardless of a desire to confess, which may or may not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Icelandic Prime minister, as well as some other leading members of the leftist 
government in power 2009 to 2013 often applied vocabulary of transitional justice in the 
public comments. See Stothard, Michael. “Iceland: Recovery and reconciliation”, The 






follow. This is also what is generally assumed when programs of reconciliation 
are proposed, i.e. that perpetrators do not and will not desire to confess but 
might be compelled to do so if offered a reward, especially when the reward is 
either amnesty or a reduced prison sentence. Regaining trust or respect may 
also be a strong incentive, but more difficult to guarantee (Cutter Patel, 2009). 
An important question is also to what extent perpetrators can be 
collective actors such as groups, parties or even nations. Germans in the 
decades after WWII created official programs to achieve reconciliation 
internationally in a move that at least acknowledged collective responsibility 
although without formally doing so (De Greiff, 2006, p. 412). One may see its 
actions as expressing a collective desire to face and deal with past wrongdoing 
in order to regain trust but without any explicit form of reward. 
There are interesting cases where individual perpetrators show a desire 
to tell their story in the absence of any guarantees of reward. In the 
documentary film The Act of Killing former torturer and executioner Anwar 
Congo and some of his gang members who participated in persecuting and 
murdering thousands of leftists in Indonesia in the 1960’s describe their 
actions, even going into detail about the methods they used to kill their 
victims (Oppenheimer, 2012). In a recently published memoir Fyodor 
Mochulsky describes his time as a guard in Pechorlag – one of the prison 
camps in the Soviet Gulag (Mochulsky, 2010). Although the film and the 
memoir describe different times and places both are cases where participants 
in unspeakable brutality talk about their actions and explain their place in a 
repressive system. There are many other interesting cases of confessionals in 
memoir literature of course. One should therefore not dismiss the idea that 
there may be strong personal reasons for forming a desire to confess, tell the 
truth. 
The memoir however brings to the fore another dimension of truth 
telling – sincerity. It can be a little difficult to draw a clear distinction between 
the desire to tell the truth on the one hand, and a desire to justify one’s 
actions on the other. It is true of even the most horrendous crimes that 
perpetrators usually have a way of describing their actions as a normal part of 





truths as presented by perpetrators: If there is reward, a story may be designed 
to reach the standard necessary to get the reward. If there is no reward, the 
desire may be to justify oneself rather than tell the truth. 
A confession or recanting publicly made therefore may seem to need to 
fulfill one additional condition, i.e. to present a genuine attempt to reflect on, 
reinterpret and understand one’s own past actions and decisions. This is a 
vastly more demanding enterprise than simply “telling the truth”. True 
reconciliation, on this account, requires not only that former perpetrators tell 
their own story but that they actually listen to the stories told by their victims, 
or by those left behind by their victims. They must not only seek to reveal 
details of their actions, but also come to terms with having themselves made 
wrong choices – having committed acts that cannot be justified and having 
done so knowingly. This turns out to be a rather hard demand since most 
people, we can assume, seek to describe their actions in a context in which 
their choices become understandable and to some extent excusable, even if 
not justifiable. 
One may conclude that substantial rewards will be necessary to achieve 
reconciliation not because only rewards can bring about desire or because 
there may not be other incentives for telling the truth, but because true 
reconciliation requires that victims and perpetrators join forces in 
reconstructing a common narrative of past injustices. In other words there 
must be a common moral project they can voluntarily engage in thereby 
abandoning their right or claim to other narratives. As we will see it is not 
obvious that this is achievable except in rare cases. 
 
3. Reconciling an economically and politically broken society 
I will now discuss events in Iceland after the economic collapse of 2008 in the 
context of social reconciliation. Much public discussion in Iceland after the 
bankruptcy of its major financial institutions centered around the sense of 
betrayal brought about by the crisis, the widely shared view that key players in 
business and political life were guilty of serious wrongdoing, if not punishable 
by law, then at least morally unacceptable, and that a “social contract” had 





reconciliation was a part of this way of seeing things and therefore also the 
question of what such reconciliation essentially is. 
I will not give an overview of the crisis itself. Several narrative accounts 
of the events that preceded the crisis, the crisis itself and its aftermath do exist 
(see e.g. Bergmann, 2014; Árnason, 2010; Jóhannesson, 2009). What I will do 
here is discuss two cases that evoke meaningful questions about what 
reconciliation is, whether it is desirable and what is achieved by it. The first 
case involves questions about collective responsibility and eventually a 
dramatic refusal (by way of a national referendum) to admit such 
responsibility. The second case has to do with individual responsibility and a 
refusal by leading politicians to admit to wrongdoing. The cases were 
eventually resolved in the courts, but because of the concurrent public 
discussion of reconciliation, it is both instructive and important to understand 
them in that context. 
After the financial collapse in Iceland in 2008 it was frequently argued 
that a full recovery would need much more than economic reconstruction. As 
public discussion and considerable grassroots activism very well showed, it 
was a common view that there was widespread corruption and wrongdoing 
behind the complete failure of the Icelandic government to prepare for and 
react to the international financial crisis which resulted in a disaster for a large 
part of the Icelandic population (Bernburg, 2014). Since the culprits of the 
collapse were bankers and financial leaders who had led the financial boom in 
the preceding years, these people were expected to show remorse and ask for 
forgiveness. As a rule they were also expected to be found criminally liable 
and thus to be punished in due time (Gylfason, 2013). In addition to this 
slightly naïve demand for remorse and punishment, a second argument was 
also frequently made by activists, according to which full reconciliation 
required also a thorough revision of pre-crash politics, and a renewal of “the 
social contract”. The second argument was not based on an alleged need for 
punishment, admission was emphasized instead and the need for some kind 





bankers immunity, the truth about what was actually going on behind the 
scenes in the international financial companies in Iceland could be exposed.2 
One of the moves by parliament in the aftermath of the crisis was to 
appoint a so-called Special Investigation Commission (SIC) to investigate 
both the government and the financial companies and write a report on 
policies and practices that could explain the extreme vulnerability of the 
Icelandic economy when the international crisis hit. The commission 
identified a number of areas where negligence, incompetence, corruption or 
fraud seemed to have played a role in how events later developed. The 
committee also indicated that a few government ministers and high-ranking 
officials could be held criminally responsible for their actions (or inaction) in 
the period leading to the crisis (Special Investigation Commission, 2010).  
Even though pre-crash policies in Iceland were not characterized by 
wrongful arrests, killings or repressive measures, the feeling of deception and 
betrayal created a need for reconciliation. Reconciliation was expected to 
restore faith in the political system and of course in the political leaders whose 
careers were based on the traditional political parties. Thus reconciliation was 
seen as a moral recovery in which responsibility and accountability became 
key notions. The government would launch a number of initiatives designed 
to increase trust in the political leadership, make sure that it was clear that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Truth commissions were discussed a lot for years after 2008 and it was frequently argued 
that the Special Investigation Commission was to be seen as such a commission was heard 
both before and after it delivered its report. The National Court which played an important 
role later on was by some also to be seen as such a commission. For some of the more 
interesting newspaper articles see Hermannsson, Birgir. “Um sannleiksnefnd” [About a 
Truth Commission], Fréttablaðið (26 March 2012). Avalable at http://www.visir.is/um-
sannleiksnefnd/article/2012703269952; Helagson, Þorkell. “Sannleikurinn mun gera yður 
frjálsa” [The Truth will make you free], Fréttablaðið (29 September 2010). Available at 
http://www.visir.is/sannleikurinn-mun-gera-ydur-frjalsa/article/2010993397543; Bowers, 
Simon. “How Iceland's banking flaws brought down the country's economy”, Guardian (12 






central administration had learned its lesson and, last but not least, restore 
Iceland’s international reputation.3 The interesting dimension of that last part 
was that it seemed on the face of it to require the admission of some 
collective responsibility of Icelanders for the huge losses sustained by 
individuals and organizations in other countries. My first example is about 
such responsibility. 
 
4. Taking responsibility – or not: Icesave 
One of the greatest disasters of the 2008 crisis was the bankruptcy of 
Landsbanki Íslands. This bank, formerly state owned but privatized in 2002, 
had not long before the crisis launched a new kind of savings accounts in the 
UK and the Netherlands, which, because of the high interest rate offered on 
regular savings, was widely advertised as a huge success in the months before 
the crisis. When the bank fell thousands of customers, individuals, companies, 
NGO’s and public organizations, lost the money they had put into these 
accounts, known by the name of Icesave. Since according to law, in case of a 
crisis, banking institutions are supposed to be able to recover possible losses 
of account holders up to a certain amount they are required to make payments 
to an insurance fund which should have enough to cover the total amount the 
bank would be liable to pay (Act 98/1999). Since only individual account 
holders, not organizations, have such guarantees and payments to each 
account holder are limited, it is not unreasonable that even in case of a total 
collapse a bank may fulfill its legal obligations. 
The Icelandic insurance fund however was very far from being able to 
do so since the Icelandic banks had neglected their payments and the 
Icelandic government had failed to react. Therefore the governments of the 
Netherlands and the UK, as well as the European Union maintained that the 
Icelandic government was responsible and should provide the funds needed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This includes a permanent committe to strengthen ethical practices in ministries and 
public institutions. The committe which was called Coordination committee 
(Samhæfingarnefnd) led the creation of ethihcal codes and guidelines for the 





to pay the legally required compensation to individual account holders. The 
UK and Dutch governments paid the amount due to their citizens and 
subsequently made a claim on Iceland. The Icelandic government accepted 
this at first and negotiations started on how to repay the debt. 
When the government submitted a bill to Parliament in the spring of 2009, 
which granted a permission to give Landsbankinn a state guarantee for paying 
back debts to the Dutch and British governments, resistance became visible 
(Act 96/2009). And as parliament discussed the proposed agreement, public 
dissatisfaction about this situation grew. There was considerable public 
discussion about how to proceed reflected partly in commentaries on the 
proposed legislation, solicited by the parliament committee responsible for 
amending the bill. According to the draft agreement the Icelandic government 
was liable to pay up to 6,5 billion USD a staggering amount for such a small 
nation (the inhabitants of Iceland are around 330.000 and the GDP in 2009 
around 12 billion USD). The bank’s assets were of course expected to cover a 
substantial part of this amount, but it seemed clear nevertheless that 
Icelanders would be paying a heavy price for the sins of their fallen bankers. 
No one could say in advance how much of the debt assets would cover and 
the interest would in any case be a substantial burden for Iceland. 
The situation evokes questions about collective responsibility. Among 
the many technical and legal comments the parliament received, one prepared 
by a moral philosopher briefly caught the public attention. It argued in the 
following way: What consequences for the Icelandic public can be expected 
from the agreement? If it is taken for granted that the financial burdens 
accepted by the agreement are not too heavy, i.e. will not lead to national 
bankruptcy, one might assume that the experience will be a lesson from which 
the Icelandic public will not only learn, but from which its “moral strength” 
will be increased. The public will have to face considerable hardships and, so 
the argument goes, since these burdens will generally be understood as a 
consequence of former misjudgment the result will be a collective resolve not 
to do the same mistakes again. (Frímannsson, 2009). 
There are premises for this view, both empirical and moral that have to 






1. National responsibility for this debt, even though resulting from 
incompetence or dishonesty of the bank owners, is accepted by at 
least a majority of Icelanders. 
2. It is assumed that the public (at least a majority) will accept the 
agreement negotiated by the government and ratified by the 
parliament. 
3. It is assumed that the public will accept this even in case a legal 
requirement for an obligation to pay may be disputed in court. 
4. The public is assumed to largely share views on lessons to be drawn 
from the financial hardships. 
 
I will ignore the empirical questions here, i.e. to what extent public opinion 
may or may not actually be in line with such assumptions, and focus on the 
moral questions: 
 
1q. Is there a strong moral argument for accepting the responsibility of 
one society to compensate losses by private individuals in another 
country caused by the irresponsible behavior of owners and leaders 
of a private bank?  
2q. Is there a strong moral reason for the public to accept a decision by 
their government to put them through considerable hardships 
because of such responsibility?  
3q. Can the absence of legal requirement be seen as independent from 
the moral obligation? 
4q. Why should we expect there to be similar views among the public 
about lessons to be drawn from the disaster? 
 
As we can see 1q and 2q have similar characteristics, they are general 
questions about accepting responsibility and accepting a decision made by 
one’s own government. The argument for answering 1q affirmatively is this: 
Landsbankinn operated as an Icelandic bank in the UK and the 





government, which had an opportunity to regulate its operations in a way that 
would have prevented the disaster or at least its worst consequences. Icelandic 
citizens choose their leaders in democratic elections and thereby carry a 
responsibility for their actions on their behalf. It is therefore not unreasonable 
that if Landsbankinn was unprepared for its collapse and had not even 
collected a fraction of what was needed to fulfill legal obligations, the 
Icelandic government should be held responsible.  
Similarly, for 2q, an affirmative answer seems to be on firm moral 
ground: A governmental decision may be unpopular. Since however citizens 
are morally responsible for the acts of their government and in a democratic 
society have all means to express their views, it is crucial that they see 
governmental decisions as binding. It is clearly quite important that the 
government make a strong case to defend its decision, but once it has been 
reached the discussion should not be about whether to fulfill the 
corresponding obligations but how. So if the government is acting within the 
limits of what is possible (not risking national bankruptcy) and is acting in 
order to fulfill moral or legal obligations the public must accept the result. 
The answer to 3q is less clear. The relative harm caused by each course 
of action could be assessed from a utilitarian point of view, which might lead 
to the conclusion that the overall consequences provide a strong moral 
argument for assuming responsibility. But one might also argue that a moral 
obligation emerges from the specific duties citizens and governments have 
and that to honor such obligations must be ranked higher than their well-
being i.e. given that it will not cause social collapse or state bankruptcy or 
something of that magnitude, which would have deep and lasting negative 
effects on Icelandic society. Thus the moral and legal obligations have similar 
limits: Future economic capacity. Only what can be done can be required. 
For the moral argument described above 4q however is crucial. What are 
the lessons from the situation and why should Icelanders in general see it as 
the morally right course of action to shoulder this debt? If it is generally 
accepted that conditions 1, 2 and 3 are met, people can still be divided about 
the lessons. It might be that there should be better rules, or that they should 





ambitions: Never allow the banks to become so big, or it might be: Make sure 
that if the state is to be held responsible, adequate measures are taken to 
ensure its interests in case the bank fails. And so on. 
A negative answer to 4q (and such an answer seems inevitable) illustrates 
a certain truth about reconciliation. In order that a society can draw “lessons” 
from common hardships we must assume a more narrow range of public 
reasoning and discussion than liberal democratic society requires. But such 
disagreement reflects back on the answers to 1q, 2q and 3q: The presence of 
strong moral reasons to accept responsibility, governmental decisions on how 
to deal with it and that moral reasons may be strong enough to go beyond 
legal obligations does not mean the absence of legitimate disagreement about 
these answers. What remains is the much weaker argument that by negotiating 
the Icelandic government would be resurrecting some of the country’s lost 
international reputation. But since international reputation is a questionable 
commodity, it would in fact seem that the government was simply acting to 
identify Icelanders collectively as perpetrators without there being any visible 
reward for doing so. 
The Icesave dispute ended without any agreement. Three times the 
government submitted a bill to parliament on the terms of agreement with 
The Netherlands and the UK. First parliament rejected the bill, but the 
second and the third bill, both of which were passed by parliament, were 
voted on in referendums after a presidential veto. In both cases they were 
rejected (Bergmann 2014). Eventually the EFTA court ruled on the legal 
issues involved that Iceland was indeed not liable in this case and only what 
could be covered from the ruins of the bankrupt Landsbankinn could be used 
to cover these debts (see Case E-16/11 - EFTA Surveillance Authority v 
Iceland). 
 
5. Prosecuting the Prime minister 
A second much debated move by the Icelandic parliament after the release of 
the SIC report, was to use the existing law and seek to prosecute some of the 
ministers of the government that had come to office in 2007 and was in 





decide to prosecute government ministers or other high officials for 
wrongdoing while in office. In such cases a special court – the National Court 
– is appointed where 12 judges determine guilt or innocence (Act 3/1963, Act 
4/1963). 
The SIC had by some commentators been described as a “truth 
commission” or at least as a commission tasked with bringing out the truth 
rather than seek culprits. The commission did not directly recommend 
prosecution but pointed out that three ministers of the previous government 
and at least three high ranking officials could, according to the law, be 
prosecuted and brought trial before the National court. Later a Parliamentary 
committee recommended that four ministers of the previous government be 
prosecuted (Skýrsla þingmannanefndar, 2010). 
It seems that politicians who supported this move considered it to be 
reconciliatory in the sense that by showing willingness to actually use the law 
to bring former political leaders to trial for their actions – or negligence – 
before the crisis, the political establishment would accept responsibility, and in 
this sense prosecution would contribute to restoring trust in government (see 
Málshöfðun gegn ráðherrum). Opponents conceived quite differently of the 
whole exercise, seeing it as nothing more than willingness to go to the 
extremes in humiliating members of the previous government (Omzigt, 2013; 
Backman, 2013). 
The Icelandic Parliament voted on 28 September 2010 on four different 
proposals to prosecute the former Prime minister (fPM), the former Finance 
minister (fFM), the former minister of Banking and Trade (fBTM) and the 
former minister of Foreign Affairs (fFAM). Before the voting it was clear that 
MP’s were divided on the issue. For some MP’s it was a difficult choice to 
support prosecuting former colleagues and friends. The outcome however 
was surprising to many observers. While the Parliament decided not to 





former Prime minister. As the media reported he was “singled out” as the 
main or in fact only the culprit among politicians for what had happened.4 
This result of the voting did almost certainly not reflect the will of the 
majority of parliamentarians, but the decision only to vote separately on the 
each person created conditions where the outcome as a whole could 
contradict majority opinion. Table 1 shows the number of votes for and 
against prosecuting each minister: 
 
TABLE 1 For Against Abstentions 
fPM 33 30  
fFAM 29 34  
fFM 31 32  
fBTM 27 35 1 
 
One and a half year later the National Court announced its judgement in 
which the former Prime Minister Geir Haarde was found guilty of one of four 
charges brought against him. While the court argued that Mr. Haarde cold not 
be held responsible for the crisis in Iceland, his negligence in holding special 
ministerial meetings to discuss and deal with the financial situation in the 
months preceding it, was found to amount to criminal negligence. Although 
he was found guilty the court decided not to punish him and the costs of the 
trial, including Mr. Haarde’s defense were paid by the state (Landsdómur 
2012). 
Geir Haarde is the only politician who has been found guilty of a 
criminal offense due to the financial crisis. Although his violation may seem 
small – nothing more than a formality – a closer reading of the judicial 
argument shows that it covers wide-ranging criticism. Thus it can be argued 
that the court found Mr. Haarde culpable in many ways, which it addresses in 
its verdict, yet could only convict him on a technical issue.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I am using the coverage of the daily DV for the figures and overview of the voting. See 
Guðbrandsdóttir, Kristjana. “Geir einn í snörunni”, DV (29 September 2010), 1-3. 





Mr Haarde reacted aggressively to his conviction and in a number of 
interviews he derided the court’s argument calling his conviction ridiculous. 
He seemed to have considerable public support and in the days after the court 
concluded, the public seemed split on whether this whole thing had been a 
good idea or not. If the idea had been that some justice could be found by 
actually prosecuting one of the leading politicians of the pre-crisis era, and 
that a careful consideration of all arguments by a court would lead, if not to a 
consensus then at least to some closure, that was fully rebutted, no 
reconciliation came out of the affair. It rather increased tensions and hostility 
between supporters of the post-crisis government and those people and 
movements that had been in power before the crisis.6 
Part of the reason can be seen from an analysis of the vote itself. The 
Icelandic Parliament has 63 MP’s. Of those 30 voted against prosecuting any 
of the former ministers, while 26 voted for prosecuting all of them. 7 MP’s 
wanted to prosecute some but not all. If we assume that those voting to 
prosecute two or three of the former ministers would have preferred 
prosecuting no one to prosecuting only one we can also make some guesses at 
the possible preference rankings. The following table shows the breakdown: 
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6 The case was covered extensively by Icelandic news media. A general overview of events 
and announcements around the verdict can be found in Reykjavík Grapevine 5 2012, 3-17 















5 1 2 2 
 
If we simply rank the options from the point of view who was included we 
get a corresponding order where all those who voted to convict the former 
Prime minister also prefer the outcome where he is prosecuted to any other 
outcome. Given the public debates on the four cases however, where it was 
frequently pointed out that prosecuting only the former Prime minister was 
unfair, it is quite likely that the preference ranking is not properly reflected in 
the actual outcome. 
Let’s first assume that parliamentarians are governed by a willingness to 
prosecute in the sense that they are more willing to accept an option where 
someone they do not want prosecuted is, than the option where someone 
they want prosecuted is not. In such a case the option to prosecute no one 
will clearly be lowest but, interestingly, the winning outcome (only one 
prosecuted) comes next, number 4. If one assumes, on the other hand, that 
the parliamentarians are governed by a reluctance to prosecute in the sense 
that they will prefer an outcome where someone they want prosecuted is not, 
to an outcome where someone they do not want prosecuted is, the ranking 
reverses with respect to no one or everyone: Now, it seems, the option to 
prosecute no one would be ranked first, and the winning outcome, where only 
Mr. Haarde is prosecuted is actually the lowest ranking outcome. This 
conclusion is justified by the assumption that those reluctant to prosecute 
would still see it as more reasonable to prosecute all four than just some of 
them and would regard prosecuting only one of the four as unfair. 
One can think of a third possibility, namely that parliamentarians are 
governed by certain political calculations, which would make them avoid 
prosecutions if they could, but are willing to agree to prosecuting someone to 
fulfill a public demand for doing so and in order to prove critics wrong about 





might be ranked first, prosecuting everyone would, again, come second. 
Given the hindsight of the fierce criticism that the actual result evoked, 
prosecuting three of the former ministers should be ranked above prosecuting 
only the former Prime minister. So once more we end with that outcome as 
ranking lowest. 
Now the reason one can speculate about preference rankings as separate 
from the actual outcome of the voting is the fact that the parliamentarians 
voted on each individual case and therefore were not directly influenced by 
how they rated the general outcome. We can assume that at least 30 would 
always rate prosecuting no one highest and at most 33 would rate prosecuting 
someone above prosecuting no one. The question really is how many would 
prefer prosecuting no one to any combination other than their own. My guess 
is that very few of the MP’s would have preferred prosecuting only the former 
Prime minister to prosecuting no one since there seemed to be a widespread 
agreement that prosecuting only him was not fair and therefore would not 
have the desired reconciliatory effect. Of course the MP’s could have made 
deals before the voting to ensure that the outcome would not be as 
embarrassing as it was. But a lack of trust among them and deep 
disagreements about the process seems to have prevented that. 
Before the parliament voted opinion polls showed consistently that 
Icelanders believed politicians should be prosecuted but found it unlikely that 
Parliamentarians would actually decide to go against their own in such a way. 
After the vote the public did not reward their politicians by supporting the 
decision to actually go after the Prime Minister, but turned against the 
decision. According to opinion polls, a majority considered the prosecution of 
Mr. Haarde and subsequent trial to be unfair.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Þjóðarpúls Gallup 12. tbl. 18. árg., október 2010. According to this Gallup poll 83% of 
voters were not satisfied with only Mr Haarde being prosecuted. In another Gallup poll 
made during the trial the public seems to have formed opposed camps of equal size where 
one was fiercely opposed to the trial, the other supportive of it. Þjóðarpúls Gallup 15. mars 





The whole exercise can fairly be described as a disaster, if the idea was 
that a fair trial could bring people together in reflecting on past mistakes and 
by making politicians accountable for their actions. The former Prime 
minister had previously completely refused to admit that he or his 
government could in any sense be held accountable for the economic collapse 
since the events in Iceland were simply a result of the international financial 
turmoil. Even though he was found guilty of criminal negligence, since the 
verdict was based on a technical issue, it carried limited weight.8 
In an interesting way both parliament and the National court thus clearly 
failed in their moral aspirations because of the choice to test the limits of the 
law. Since the ministers could not be prosecuted collectively parliament had to 
vote on each of them individually and since the National court could only 
recognize culpability in terms of law-breaking the question of to what extent 
the government had failed morally could not really be addressed apart from 
the results of the SIC report.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have discussed two attempts to address past mistakes and 
wrongdoings in a way that might have led to some social reconciliation – 
which certainly was intended. Both failed in interesting ways. The Icelandic 
government’s attempts to reach a deal with the Dutch and British 
governments on Icesave were met with resistance at home since to a great 
number of Icelanders it seemed wrong to accept the blame for the collapse of 
a private bank by agreeing pay its debts. The prosecution of the former Prime 
minister failed to create any consensus on ministerial responsibility since 
prosecuting him alone seemed to the majority of Icelanders simply to be 
unfair. In addition to that the parliament’s handling of the case was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Mr Haarde subsequently appealed his case to the European Court of Human rights where 
it has been accepted for review, see Valdimarsson, Omar R. “European Human Rights 







symptomatic of inner divisions, strive and distrust rather than a broad effort 
to heal wounds caused by the crisis. 
These examples not only show that reconciliation may be hard to 
achieve but also suggest that moral aspirations over and above legally 
achievable goals may be misplaced. Iceland resembled transitional societies, as 
the view was widespread that great injustice had been done which needed to 
be addressed through measures that went beyond what the established 
political and legal system could accommodate.  
Social reconciliation may require unity of vision and moral purpose, 
which cannot be had in a liberal society where individual rights remain in the 
foreground. A liberal society not only imposes strict limitations on power to 
interfere with individuals. It also systematically prefers division to 
reconciliation since the expression of dissent indicates liberty rather than the 
expression of consent. Reconciliation requires consensual relations, which the 
liberal society continuously puts in doubt, and which are often associated with 
coercive forms of government rather than liberal. In both of these cases the 
government imposed certain solutions on citizens: The Icesave agreement was 
meant to reconcile Iceland with the rest of the world and the prosecution of 
the former Prime Minister symbolically to bring to a conclusion the discussion 
of how the government failed to respond to the crisis. In the first case certain 
mechanisms in the Icelandic constitutional structure made it impossible for 
the government to follow through on its policy, since the president was able 
to make the highly unusual move of abiding to demands by public groups and 
refuse to sign legislation passed by the parliament, which enforced a 
referendum on the issue not once but twice. In the second case the parliament 
decided to prosecute in a way that probably contradicted what even 
parliamentarians themselves considered fair and, even though conviction was 
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Passed 27 December 1999. Accessible at 
http://www.althingi.is/lagas/134/1999098.html. 
 
Act 3/1963. Lög um landsdóm. Passed 19 February 1963. 
 
Act 4/1963. Lög um ráðherrábyrgð. Passed 19 February 1963. 
 
Árnason, Vilhjálmur, et al. (2010). “Siðferði og starfshættir í tengslum við fall 
íslensku bankanna 2008” [Ethical conduct and administrative practice in 
connection with the collapse of the Icelandic banks in 2008], Vol. 8 of 
Special Investigation Commission (2010). Reykjavík: Rannsóknarnefnd 
Alþingis. 
 
Árnason, Vilhjálmur (2010). “Moral analysis of an economic collapse – an 
exercise in practical ethics”, Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 4(1), 101-123. 
 
Backman, Þuríður (2013). Dissenting Opinion to the report Keeping political and 





Bergmann, Eirikur (2014). Iceland and the International Financial Crisis: Boom, Bust 
and Recovery. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Bernburg, Jón Gunnar (2014). “Financial crisis and protest in Iceland, 
October 2008–January 2009”. CritCom A Forum for Research & Commentary 




Burnet, Jennie E. (2008). “The injustice of local justice: Truth, reconciliation, 





Journal 3(2), 173-193 (Article 4). Available at 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol3/iss2/4. 
 
Case E-16/11 - EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland. Delivered in open 




Comissao Nacional da Verdade (2014). Relatorio vol. 1-3. Brazil: CNV. 
 
Cutter Patel, Ana (2009). “Transitional justice, DDR, and security sector 
reform”, Disarming the Past. Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants. In Cutter 
Patel, Ana, et al. (eds.). Advancing Transitional Justice Series. New York: 
Social Science Research Council. 
 
Philpott, Daniel (2012). Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
De Greiff, Pablo (ed.) (2006). The Handbook of Reparations. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Frímannsson, Guðmundur Heiðar (2009). “Álitsgerð um frumvarp um ábyrgð 
ríkisins á skuld Tryggingasjóðs innistæðueigenda og fjárfesta vegna 
Icesavereikninga Landsbanka Íslands” [Assessment of the bill on the 
State guarantee for the payment of the debt of the Insurance fund of 
account holders and investors because of Icesaveaccounts in Landsbanki 
Íslands]. Submitted to the Icealandic Parliament’s Finance Committee 17 
July 2009. 
 
Gylfason, Þorvaldur (2014). “Tvöfalt líf. Allir segjast vera saklausir. Samtal við 
Þráin Bertelsson” [A Double Life. Everone says they are innocent. A 
Conversation with Þráinn Bertelsson], Tímarit Máls og menningar 75(4). 
 
Gylfason, Þorvaldur (2013). “From Collapse to Constitution.” In Paganetto, 
L. (ed.). Public Debt, Global Governance and Economic Dynamism. Milano: 
Springer Milan, 379-417. 
 
Jóhannesson, Guðni Th. (2009). Hrunið: Ísland á barmi gjaldþrotsog upplausnar 
[The Collapse. Iceland on the verge of bankruptcy and disintegration]. 
Reykjavík: JPV. 
 
Landsdómur 2012. Dómur 23.04.2012 í landsdómsmálinu nr. 3/2011: Alþingi 
gegn Geir Hilmari Haarde. Accessible at 
http://www.landsdómur.is/domar-og-urskurdir/nr/77. 
 
Málshöfðun gegn ráðherrum 706. mál, 138. session 2009–2010. The 






thingum/ferill/?ltg=138&mnr=706A ́rnason, Vilhja ́lmur (2010).  
 
Mochulsky, Fyodor (2010). Gulag Boss. A Soviet Memoir. (Deborah Kaple ed. 
and transl.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ólafsson, Jón (2009). “Innri þroski, ímynd og samfélagssáttmáli – Gagnrýni á 
tímum góðæris og samstöðu” [Inner growth, image and a social contract 
– Social criticism in times of wealth and solidarity], Tímarit Máls og 
menningar 70(4). 
 
Omzigt, Pieter (2013). Keeping political and criminal responsibility separate. Report for 
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. European Council, Stras-
bourg. Available at 
http://www.assembly.coe.int/Communication/ajdoc15_2013.pdf. 
 
Oppenheimer, Joshua (Dir.) (2012). The Act of Killing (Film). Final Cut for 
Real. 
 
Pankhurst, Donna (1999). “Issues of justice and reconciliation in complex 
political emergencies: Conceptualising reconciliation, justice and peace”, 
Third World Quarterly 20(1), Complex Political Emergencies (Feb. 1999), 
239-256. 
 
Skýrsla þingmannanefndar til að fjalla um skýrslu rannsóknarnefndar Alþingis [Report 
of a Parliamentarians’ Committee to review the Special Investigation 
Committee Report] (2010). 138. löggjafarþing 2009-2010. Þskj. 1501 — 
705. mál. 
 
Special Investigation Commission (2010). Aðdragandi og orsakir falls íslensku 
bankanna [Causes and effects of the fall of the Icelandic banks]. 
Reykjavik: Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis. 
 
Lambourne, Wendy (2004). “Post-conflict peacebuilding: Meeting human 
needs for justice and reconciliation”, Peace, Conflict and Development #4 
(April). Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/ssis/peace-conflict-and-
development/issue-4/PostConflictPeacebuilding.pdf. 
 
